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IN THE SUPRE~lE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ILARHY C. GHEGUIIX,
\
l'laia tiff-ll C8 JJlllld ca I, )
vs.

\ Case No.

l\IUTUAL OF O)lA IIA l'.\!Sl 'H- l
ANCE COl\IP.\.XY and l·~Ti'ED\
BENE FI 'l' LIFE IXSl TJL\XCE

COMPANY

'

11544

.
1Jcjcndo11is-Appcllrmts.,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

PRELL\IINARY STATE:\IENT
The parties will be ref erred to as in the Court
below or Defendants may be referred to as the Insurance Company, Insurance Companies, the Company or
Companies. All italics are ours.

STATEMENT OF THE I\:IXD OF CASE
This is an action for benefits claimed due for total
disability under two insurance policies.
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DISPOSITION IX THE LO\\'ER COURT
The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff against
Defendants and J u<lgment was rendered thereon in the
amounts of $15,018.75 for past amounts due on both
policies to the time of trial, plus six percent ( G%) per
annum interest, plus $:34,:207.0:3 for future installments
due on both policies, discounted to present value (R.
39, 40).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the Trial Court's J udgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Both disability policies were in full force and effect
on the date of Plaintiff's accident, September 21, 1964.
The policy with United Benefit Life Insurance
Company (Ex. P .1) provides for a monthly benefit
of $100.00 per month for the life of insured for a total
and permanent disability. The term "total loss of ~ime"
is defined by the policy as "that period of time during
which the insured ~Y able to perform none of his occupational duties, recei·ves 110 pay for performing work
or service of any kind, and is regularly attended b,IJ a
legally qtudified physician, other tlzan himself." The
insuring clause of this policy insures the person named
"against loss of life, limlJ, or sight result.ing directly and

2
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i11dCJ:c11dc11tly of all other causes from accidental hodil,1;
injuries receit•cd 7.1.:hile this policy is in force, and against
loss of time hcr;in11iny <chilc this policy is in force and
resulting from ( 1) accidental bodily i11;urics received
nd1ilc this policy is in force, or ( 2) sickness contracted

while this policy is in force ... "
The policy vdth ::Jlulual of Omaha (Ex. P.2) provides benefits of $200.00 per month for total disability
for the period ending 011 the first policy renewal date
following a 15-year period beginning on the policy date.
A "total loss of time" defined by this policy "mea111.; that
period of time duriny 1chich you arc u nablc to perform
each and every dut,lj of yo11r occupation, receive no
earninys for performiny other work or service and receive medical treatment; provided, however, after the
first twelve months of such period of time, it also means
that period of time which .IJOU are unable to engage
in any other yainful work or service for which you are
reasonably fitted by education, traininy or experience."
The policy further defines "injuries" as meaning "accidental bodil.IJ injuries received ·rchile this policy is in
force and resultinr; in loss independently of siclmes.Y
and other causes."

After the accident of September 21, 1964 had been
properly reported, the Companies thereafter made
monthly payments and Plaintiff submitted reports as
req uirecl, signed by his treating doctor (Ex. D .13)
through .May of 19()5 (Ex. P.4, P.5). He received a
letter from Mutual of Omaha dated J unc 18, 1965,
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whereby the Company refused to pay any additional
benefits. This letter stated in part as follows Ex. P.3) :
" ... , it was once again reviewed by the Home
Office and it has been determined that the loss
due to injury sustained on September 22, 1964,
would he payable to February 22, 1965. Since
disability continues since that date, it would he
considered a loss due to sickness caused by the
'spondylolisthesis' and that both policies involved
does indicate that with loss due to sickness, and
without confinement, not required to remain indoors, that such income would be payable not
exceeding three months for any one sickness.

A review of the file indicated that the loss has
been non-confining since 2-22-65 and the drafts
for $300.00 would represent the final payment of
benefits due because of non-confining total disa bili t.IJ."
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the lawsuits in question
seeking to recover benefits for total, permanent disability provided by said policies.
Plaintiff is a 54 year old man with a fifth grade
education. He has worked for approximately 30 years,
all of his adult life, as a brick laye1 except for a six
months period of time when he was a easer and stacker
for Fisher Brewery in approximately 1943 (R. 52, 53).
He has had no experience other than as a brick layer.
Brick laying involves hard physical labor, involving
bending, lifting and moving mortar in a wheelbarrow.
Plaintiff has, on occasion, worked as a brick contractor,
but as a brick contractor, he had to perform the same

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

kinJ of hard physical labor as a brick layer ( R. 53, 5-t.).
Prior to the accident in question, he had worked coutinuously ancl had enjoyed good health. He had ne,·cr
had any complaints of back pain, and had never seen
a doctor for complaints in his back ( R. 54, 55).
On September 21, 1964, while working for \\T estern
States l\lasonry on a job at 24th South and 8th \Vest,
Plaintiff was working along a wall on a scaffold, when,
all of a sudden, the plank fell out from underneath him
and he had to grab the wall and the scaffold and hang
for a period of time to keep from falling approximately
H feet. He was ultimately rescued (R. 5G) . .Approximately an hour and one-half later, his back started to
ache and by 4 :00 P.M. it was "killing" him. This pain
was in his low back and radiated down his left leg (ll.
5(), 57).

At the time of the accident, Plaintiff weighed
approximately ~18 pounds. At the time of trial, he
weighed approximately 220 pounds ( R. 58).
Plaintiff went home from work and took a hot bath,
but the pain did not leave. The next morning he saw
Dr. Lamb and was started on physical therapy (R. 58).
Dr. Lamb diagnosed Plaintiff's condition as a spondylolisthesis and that he had recefred some injury causing
pressure on the nerve roots at the lower lumbar level
accounting for the numbness that he had, and the pain
that he had in his back and in his legs ( R. 92). Plaintiff
was given physical therapy in the hospital in October
but he failed to respond ( R. 93, 94).

5
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On October :23, 1964, Dr. Lamb operated on Plaintiff's low back; the operation involving the remoYal of
bone oYer the spinal eallal, the lamina at L-5, an exploration of the nene roots and disc space between
L-5 and the sacrum, and a fusion between L-4 and the
sacrum ( R. 94) .
Dr. Lamb demonstrated and described to the Court
a sponlylolisthesis as a lack of bony union between the
articulation between L-5 and S-1 ( R.87, 88). The
result is a condition of instability making the spine more
susceptible to injury.
l3ecause of continued pain in the back and finding
that there was some motion between the 4th and 5th
lumbar vertebrae, Plaintiff was operated on again on
February 11, 1966, at which time there was a fusion
between L-4 and L-5, and also the joint between L-3
and L-4. His symptoms have persisted since the operation of February 11, 1966 and his case has been followed at regular intervals since that time (R. 94, 95,
96, 97).
Dr. Lamb testified that Plaintiff is permanently
disabled for most of the types of work for which he
would be equipped and specifically that he is disabled
from performing the work of a brick layer as described
to him by Plaintiff. As far as his ability to do any
physical labor, the doctor testified as follows ( R. 98) :
"Q. 'Vhat is your opinion?

A. I don't think that he is going to be able to
do any appreciable lifting or any work that re-
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quires acth·ity. any stooping or bending. As
a matter of fact, the last time he was in the office,
he was complaining considerably of' sitting for
any length of time.

(.J. Has he also complained of
periods of time?

~tanding

for any

A. Yes."
As to the cause of Plaintiffs disabilitv
. , Dr. Lamb
testified as follows ( R. 99) :
"Q. Now, doctor, assuming the accident as described and the fact that prior to the accident,
Mr. Greguhn had no complaints in his back, and
assuming the conditions you have found since
and the treatments, aud so forth, do vou ha,·e
an opinion as to whether or not the· accident
that he described on September 21, J9(i4, probably caused the disability that you've indicated?

A. Yes.
Q. 'Vhat is your opinion?

A. 'Veil, according to this man's history, he
had worked up until that time, and I never felt
that he should be released to go back to that
type of work. I don't think that he will be able
to return to that type of work.
(~. 'Vhat is your opinion in regard to the cause
of his disability?

A. I thi11ll· that. his disability is related to that
accident."

Dr. Lamb further testified that there are people
having a spondylolisthesis condition who are able to
liYe a normal life ( R. 99) .
7
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Concerning the fact that Plaintiff had some degenerative disc disease in his back prior to the accident, Dr.
Lamb testified that degenerative disc disease is something that happens to all of us; that at the age of 18,
the tissues quit building up and start to degenerate, so
we all have a certain amount of this ( R. 109) . Furthermore, Dr. Lamb testified that assuming that Plaintiff
had no complaints in his back prior to the accident as
testified to by Plaintiff, that without the accident he
could very well have gone on indefinitely without having back complaints (R. 109).
Dr. Boyd Holbrook was called as a witness by
Defendants and on cross-examination testified in part
as follows (R. 155):
"Q. And I suppose, doctor, that you would
agree that if Mr. Greguhn never had any complaints before the accident of September 21,
1964, that he suffered the accident as he described it to you, and that the complaints dated
from then, you would agree, would you not, that
this accident was the thing that precipitated
these symptoms that he later suffered?

A. Yes.
Q. And that these were the things that necessitated the operations?

A. Yes."
Dr. Holbrook also testified that even after the
second operation, x-rays showed that there was some
definite movement between L-3 and L-4 and suspected
movement between L-4 and L-5 ( R. 152) Further,
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he stated that the 20% disability rating which he
assessed was purely a disability consisting of loss of
bodily function and that Plaintiff is totally disable<l
from being a brick mason ( R. 153) .
Dr. Wallace Hess, who was called as a witness
for Defendants, also found that there was a mild amount
of motion at the fourth level and that there was a 20%
permanent partial impairment ( R. 169). On crossexamination, Dr. Hess stated that his assessment of
permanent disability is solely as to bodily function. Also,
Dr. Hess indicated that degenerative disc changes are
a common occurrence in persons growing older ( R.
172).

Plaintiff testified that at the present time, he is
unable to bend over and lift objects and that there is
110 kind of physical work which he is able to do (R. 61,
62). He further testified that in the Summer of 1968,
he made application to the Utah State Board of Education, Division of Rehabilitation, for rehabilitation
and that his application was denied (R. 63).
Dr. Moroni H. Brown was called as a witness by
Plaintiff. He is an Associate Professor of Psychology
at the University of Utah, and for 12 years or so has
been doing work at the Rehabilitation Center at the
University of Utah. He has also been a vocational consultant for the Bureau of Disability Appeals for approximately six or seven years concerning Social Security Appeals. Dr. Brown testified that he had listened
to the testimony of Dr. Lamb concerning the injuries

9
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and disability experienced by Plaintiff. He was asked
the following hypothetical question ( R. 131) :
"Q. Now, Dr. llrown, I will ask you to assume
a few facts concerning .1\ir. Greguhn. Assume
that .Mr. Greguhn is a man 54 years of age.
Assume that you observed .Mr. Greguhn here
in court, his general build and dimensions and
weight, and so forih. Assume that for the past
20 some odd years ~Ir. Greguhn has been blind
in one eye, having a reasonably good visibility
out of the other eye. Assume that his entire
adult life, .:Mr. Greguhn has worked as a brick
mason and a brick contractor in this area, except
for a short period of time, approximately six
months, when he was employed at Fisher Brewery, and was engaged in stacking objects and
other things. Assume that .Mr. Greguhn has a
fifth grade education, and assume the disability
that he now has as stated by Dr. Lamb in his
testimony, I'll ask you whether or not you have
an opinion, assuming all of these facts, as to
whether or not Mr. Greguhn can be rehabilitated
for any type of employment for profit in this
community?

*

*

A. Yes, I have an opinion.

*

Q. Now I'll ask you the question that counsel
is about to object to. \Vill you tell us your
opinion?

* *

*

A. I'd be very pessimistic about the chances of
his being rehabilitated.

Q. \Vhy is that?
A. I'm taking into consideration the fact that
it has been brought out here that he went to the

10
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fifth grade. I don't know whether he finished
the fifth grade or not, but that's his educational
background. He has had no other type of training that has been brought out here except his
work experience. His work experience has been
mentioned here, and has been of a type, according to the testimony of Dr. Lamb, that he cannot continue. I do not see much in the way of
transferable skills to other types of occupations,
and with his educational background and his age,
I would not think it would be very possible for
him to go back to school or receive vocational
training in some other area."
It was agreed and the Court ruled that testimony
concerning a lump sum to represent the present value
of future benefits would be laken out of the hearing
of the jury (R. 50). Pursuant thereto, Plaintiff produced testimony concerning the present value for the
future benefits.
It was stipulated by counsel that if Mr. Ralph
Cowan, the Trust Officer of First Security Bank, were
called to testify, he would testify that an ordinary
person in this community exercising reasonable judgment and prudence could invest money on the present
market and receive the rate of 51,4% interest in a safe
investment, preserving the principal.

Mr. German Ellsworth Brunson, a Certified Public
Accountant, a partner with the firm of Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., testified concerning the computations
for the future benefits involved in the insurance policies. Exhibit P.15 gives the figures for both policies,
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both as to the payments in arrear, with interest of 6%
per annum to the date of the trial, and as to the future
payments provided in both policies. The payments in
Policy No. 1 run through September 1, 1979, and in
Policy No. 2 for the life expectancy of 19.70 years. The
life expectancy was obtained from the United States
Life Tables 1959-61, compiled and published by the
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Public Health Service (R. 124) (Ex. P.15). This
exhibit contained the figures which later resulted in
the amount of the judgment rendered in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants, full credit having been given
in the computations for the benefits which Defendants
had paid under its claim that all Plaintiff was entitled
to was sick benefits. (R. 123, 124, 125, 126). This
exhibit was not given to the jury but was used by the
Court after the verdict was rendered for the computation of the amount of the judgment.
On cross examination as to whether or not the
tables included persons with health problems, Mr. Brunson stated that the tables related to total population
which included persons with and without health problems (R. 126, 127).
The Court instructed the jury in Instruction No.
13A:
"You are instructed that in order for the Plaintiff to prevail in this action, he has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence:
( 1) That the incident of September 21, 1964
activated and precipitated a latent condition
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to a disability condition, and ( 2) That said disability condition, if any, was a total and permanent disability as defined in these instructions.

If you find that the Plaintiff has not proved
both of the foregoing, then you must return a
verdict in favor of the Defendants and against
the Plaintiff of no cause of action."
The Court defined total and permanent disability
for the jury in Instruction No. 14 as follows:
"Total and permanent disability in this case
means that the Plaintiff has a condition which
disallows him from following his occupation and
from doing substantially all the acts that are
necessarily and usually performed by one who
follows that occupation."
And further, the Court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 16:
"You are instructed that the words in the Policy
with Mutual of Omaha, 'unable to engage in any
other gainful work or service for which you are
reasonably fitted by education, training or experience', means other work than the usual occupation of the insured, for which he is reasonably fitted by education, training or experience,
that he is physically able to perform, which work
must be remunerative and not merely nominal."
and further in Instruction No. 17:
"You are instructed that the words contained
in the Policy with United Benefit Life Insurance Company, Omaha, 'that period of time during which the insured is able to perform none of
his occupational duties, received no pay for his

13
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work of any kind', contemplates the period of
time during which the insured is physically unable to perform his regular occupation in the
sense that in order to carry on his regular occupation, he must be able to substantially perform
all the acts that are necessarily and usually performed by one who follows that occupation."
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff
and against Defendants and judgment was rendered
thereon (R. 38, 39, 40).

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINED
THE VERDICT.
The Court correctly instructed the jury as to what
they must find by a prenonderance of the evidence in
order to find in favor of the Plaintiff. The evidence
supported their finding, and, therefore, the verdict and
judgment must be upheld. Where evidence conflicts,
the verdict cannot be reversed on appeal on the ground
that it is not supported by the evidence. Lee vs. New
York Life Insurance Co., (1938) 95 Utah 445, 82 P.2d
178. Only those jury verdicts which appear to be unsupported by any credible evidence which would justify
them in the minds of reasonable men, will be disturbed
on appeal. Reynold.Y v. W. W. Clyde & Co. (1956) 5
Utah 2d 151, 298 P.2d 530.
There was ample evidence in this case that the nondisabling, asymptomatic dormant condition of spondy-

14
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lolisthesis was activated and precipitated to a disabling
condition by the accident in question. The evidence
brought the case squarely within the holding of Lee
v. New Yor/1: Life Insurance Co., supra, where the
Court stated:
"The rule, as we believe it to be on the facts
which the jury was justified in finding, is that
where au accidental injury sets in motion or
starts activity of a latent or dormant disease and
such disease contributed to the death after having
been so precipitated by lhc accident, the disease
is not a direct or iudirect cause of death, nor a
contributing cause within the meaning of the
terms of the policy, but the accident which started the mischief and precipitated the condition
resulting in death is the sole cause of death."
In that case, deceased had a diseased gall bladder prior
to the accident, but the accidental injury to his abdomen,
according to the treating doctor, caused an infection
to spread and infect the appendix making necessary the
operation which caused the death.
The uncontradicted testimony in the case at bar
is that Plaintiff worked continuously for many years
to the time of the accident with no complaint concerning his back. He had sought no medical assistance for
any problems. The case was submitted to the jury
squarely within the ruling of the Lee case as to whether
or not the incident of September 21, 1964, activated
and precipitated a latent condition to a disability condition, and whether the disability, if any, was a total
and permanent disability as defined by the instructions.
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This case is also squarely within the holding of

Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States (1937) 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060. The
Court held the disability to be within the classification
of an accident causing a diseased condition which together with the accident resulted in the disability. The
Court, in a thorough discussion of the problems presented in this type of a case, discussed the meaning of
the term "existing disease" as not meaning a temporary
disorder or derangement of the bodily organs, system,
or functions, nor a tendency or susceptibility to a disease, but a chronic or definite affliction such as would
be embraced in the common understanding and meaning of the term "diseased" or "sick". Also, the Court
held that the term "independently of all other causes"
does not mean uninfluenced or unaffected by any other
cause, but means uncontrolled l:y any other cause, that
is, that there was no independent intervening cause
unproduced or uninfluenced by the injury, which, acting
of itself and without stimulation by the injury tends
to produce the result.
The Court quotes from the opinion of Chief Justice
Rugg of 'the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the case
of Leland v. Order of United Comm,ercial Travelers of
America, 233 Mass. 558, 124 N .E. 517, as follows:

"If there is no active disease, but merely a
frail general condition, so that powers of resistence are easily overcome, or merely a tendency
to disease which is started up and made operative, whereby death results, then there may be
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recovery eveu though the accident would not
have caused that effect upon a healthy person
in a normal state."
The Court stated that any other construction "would
be so doctrinaire, so headed toward futility, that it
would reduce a policy and its coverage to contradiction
and absurdity."
The Court ref erred to a statement made by Justice
Cardozo in Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 254 N. Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914, that "a policy
of insurance is not accepted with the thought that its
coverage is to be restricted to an Apollo or a Hercules."
The opinion in the Browning case is referred to at
length in the brief of Appellants. However, Appellants
•
are relying on the dissent of Justice Wolfe as to this
particular part of the decision and not the ruling of
the Court as stated in the opinion of Justice Larson.
The ruling of the Court in the Browning case clearly
supports the instructions and the verdict in the case
at bar. The Court summarizes its holding on page 569
as follows:
"We must therefore hold that where disability
results, even though aggravated or intensified
by disease which follows as a natural, though
not necessary, consequence of an accidentp,}
physical injury, or where the disease is induced
or set in motion as a result of the injury, the
disability or death is deemed the proximate
result of the injury and not of the disease as an
independent cause."
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It will be recalled that the fact situation of the Browning case iiwolved an accidental injury to a finger in
which arthritis developed in the joint on account of a
toxemia in the body.
A similar result was obtained in the case of Thibodeaux v. Pacific 1lf utual Life Insurance Co., ( 1959)
237 La. 722, 112 So.2d 423. This case involved a similar
fact situtaion. The Plaintiff sustained a low back injury
precipitating an asymptomatic condition of spondylolisthesis to a disability. The Court quoted from 29 Am.
Jur. Sec. 932, "Insurance", Pg. 707:
"In accident insurance the question whether the
insurer is liable for an injury depends upon
the proximate cause of the loss. The term 'proximate cause', as here used, means the same as in
other cases, and a provision requiring loss to be
caused by accident 'independent of all other
causes' is equivalent to a provision requiring it
to be the proximate cause."
And further:
"A review of authorities convinces us that
where an insured has a dormant condition and
such condition is awakened by accident, the
condition is not deemed the cause of the disability
or loss which the insured suffers."
The Court also quotes from the case of De Blieux
v. Travelers' In~urance Co., 185 La. 620, 170 So. 14,
page 17:
"Does the provision of the policy 'the effect
resulting directly and exclusively of all other
causes from bodily injuries sustained during
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the life of this policy solely through accidental
means' mean that there can be no recovery if
there is a latent or dormant disease which becomes active through the agency of the accident,
and co-operates with the other effects of the accident in bringing about the death?
We think that, if the accident is the proximate
cause of the death and sets in motion or starts
a latent or dormant disease, and such disease
merely contributes to the death after being so
precipitated by the accident, it is not a proximate
cause of the death nor a contributing cause within the meaning of the terms of the policy."
Defendants in support of their argument that the
Court should have directed a verdict in their favor cite
the case of Thompson v. American Casualty Co. (1968)
20 Utah 2d 418, 439 P.2d 276. This case fully supports
the contention of Plaintiff herein that a jury question
was created by the evidence and that the Court correctly submitted the case to the jury. In the Thompson
case there were prior conditions which the Defendant
claimed cooperated with the accidental injury in causing the disability. The Plaintiff in that case contended
that the disability resulted from the accident directly
and independently of other causes. The Court reversed
the summary judgment which had been granted by the
Trial Court in favor of Defendant. The quotation
from the Thompson case in Defendants' brief was merely a recitation as to the contention that was made by
the Defendant in that case. The Court held that the
conflicting evidence required a jury determination,
which is Plaintiff's contention here.
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The case of 1'ucker v. New York Life Insurance
Company (1945) 107 Utah 478, 155 P.2d 173, also
cited by Defendants in support of their argument
that they should have had a directed verdict, is distinguishable from the case at bar. In the Tucker case, the
evidence i,vas undisputed that the deceased was suffering from an active and progressive condition which cooperated with the accidental injury in causing his death.
The Court in the 1'ucker case distinguished the
active and progressive condition from the dormant condition in the Lee case which was activated by the
accident.
Ii is submitted that the facts in the case at bar show
that the prior existing condition which Plaintiff had
was dormant.
The Court specifically required in its instructions
that before Plaintiff could prevail the jury must find
by a preponderance of the evidence that the condition
was dormant and was activated and precipitated by the
accident.
There was ample evidence in the record to support
the jury's :finding that it was.
Another Utah case supporting Plaintiff's contention is White v. National Postal Transport Association
( 1953) 1 Utah 2d 5, 261 P .2d 924. The Court in that
case held that a jury question was presented where the
deceased suffered an accidental blow to his leg and
eventually died from a heart condition. The evidence
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showed that the deceased in childhood had been afflicted
with rheumatic fever which had left him a mechanically
damaged heart. However, since youth, the heart condition had not been active. Prior to the trip on which
the accident happened, Plaintiff's doctor had found
that his heart condition was under control. As a result
of the blow to the leg, his leg was eventually amputated
and it was found that he had suffered from Buerger's
Disease. The testimony of his doctor described his heart
as damaged but that the condition was under control.
A doctor testified that a.s a result of the amputation
with its attending shock and bedrest, the inactive heart
condition could have been reactivated, that when the
heart disease is active, emboli are thrown off by the heart
and may lodge in the brain or other vital organs of the
body. All of the medical testimony at the trial agreed
that in their best judgment, deceased ~ied from the
lodging of an emboli in the brain. The Court discussed
the Lee case and held that the facts were within the
holding of the Lee case and that the Trial Court correctly submitted tha.case to the jury, stating that there
was evidence that the blow had activated the dormant
condition which contributed to the death.
See the following cases which hold that latent,
dormant conditions precipitated by an accident are
within the terms of such policies as the policies in question:

Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Hayes (IO
Cir. 1950) 184 F.2d 327, a claim on double indemnity
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prov1s1on of life insurance policy if <lea th "resulted
independently and exclusively of all other causes, solely
from bodily injury effected directly by external, violent
and accidental means"-evidence showed that deceased
suffered a fall down his basement steps and later the
same morning found dead in his car in driveway autopsy revealed that death was caused by a ball thrombus in the left auricle which had become dislodged and
impacted in the mitral orifice - there was testimony
that a fall or blow to the body in the area of the heart
might loosen or dislodge the thrombus if slightly appendant-held, jury question as to whether accidental
fall set in motion a latent or dormant disease or diseased
condition resulting in death of insured.

Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Meldrim
(I9I9) 24 Ga.App. 487, IOI S.E. 305. The Court
stated:
"To hold in any case that a contract which stipulates that the loss for death should be payable
only when the loss results solely and exclusively
from an injury, would be to hold that death must,
in every case, be instantaneous and the immediate effect of the injury in question, for it is a
matter of common knowledge that almost every
human being has some weak spot in his organism which might to a larger or smaller degree
contribute to bring about death in a particular
case, although another person under the same
circumstances might not have died. Except in
the case of a humau being who is in perfect
health, or unless death is instantaneous, death
never supervenes when it cannot be said that
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there was perhaps more than one cause which
contributed to the fatality. If a company which
writes accident insurance insures one who is
suffering from a number of maladies against
loss of life solely and exclusively due to the
accident, and an accident happens which perhaps
w:<;mld not have caused the death of a normally
healthy person and yet which, by precipitating
the baneful effects of the maladies, shortens the
life of the person in question by any appreciable
length of time, no matter how short, the injury,
as the underlying e~sential proximate cause, must
at least be said to produce the result which otherwise would not have happened at the time and
place at which it occurred."

United Insurance Co. v. Ray (1960) 271 Ala. 543,
125 So.2d 704, - crushed vertebrae when hit by tree
limb - Defendant claimed pre-existing disea~ed vertebrae - held within terms of policy.
Egan v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co. (1936)
223 Wisc. 129, 269 N.W. 667, prior existing arthritic
condition in back - Defendant claimed total disability
partly if not wholly due to prior existing arthritic condition - contention rejected by the Court and disability
held to be within terms of policy.
Scanlan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (7th
Cir., 1937) 93 F.2d 942 - action for accidental death
benefit where it appeared that insured died of a blood
clot becoming stuck in the lungs shortly after insured
had been in an automobile accident, and further that
at the time of the accident, deceased suffered from varicose vein_s - medical experts testified that the accident
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may have aggravated that condition and caused the clot
- Court affirmed a verdict for the Plaintiff holding that
the evidence supported the verdict and stated as follows:
"One may recover on an accident policy such
as here in issue although the insured suffers from
bodily infirmities. If the accident brought about
the conditions from which death resulted, the
fact that the insured was ill, aged or infirm, or
had bodily or mental infirmities, would not bar
recovery provided the accident excited the bodily
infirmity into activity and death resulted . . . .
The infirmity may have made the insured less
able to resist, but if the accident caused the condition, which in turn affected the weak spot which
did not resist as well as a healthy body, the cause
is nevertheless the accident, and recovery cannot
be avoided or evaded."
Also see ftlaryland Casualty Co. v. Hazen ( 1938)
182 Okl. 623, 79 P.2d 577; Escoe v. Metropolitan Life
In.mrance Co. (1942) 178 Misc. 698, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 833;
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Wise (1952) 207
Okl. 622, 251 P.2d 1058; Railway Officials and Accident Association v. Coady (1899) 80 Ill.App. 563; and

Jones v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance
Corp. ( 1935) 118 Fla. 648, 159 So. 804.
Instruction 13A instructed the jury strictly within
the rule laid down in the Lee case and left it for the
jury to decide whether or not the accident of September 21, 1964 activated and precipitated a latent condition to a disability condition. The jury verdict was
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supported by the evidence. Plaintiff's uncontradicted
testimony was that he had no complaints of back pain
and worked steadily for many years prior to the accident and that the symptoms which Dr. Lamb found
persisted thereafter. Dr. Lamb and Dr. Holbrook
both testified that the accident precipitated an asymptomatic spondylolisthesis to a symptomatic point and
necessitated the operations subsequently performed.
Obviously, there was ample evidence to support the
verdict of the jury as to the disability being caused by
the accident.
The finding of the jury that Plaintiff was suffering
from a total permanent disability was likewise amply
supported by the evidence. All doctors agreed that
Plaintiff had a permanent disability and that he could
not engage in physical labor. Dr. Holbrook, called by
Defendant, testified that in his opinion Plaintiff could
never perform the work of a brick mason. Plaintiff
testified that a brick contractor must also perform hard
physical labor when called upon. Dr. Moroni Brown,
who is an expert in rehabilitation, testified that in his
opinion, due to the disability, age, fifth grade education
and Plaintiff's general condition including the fact that
he has sight in only one eye, Plaintiff cannot be rehabilitated for remunerative work in this community.
Instructions No. 14, 16 and 17 were taken
from the case of Colovos vs. Home Life Insurance Co.
of New York, (1934) 83 Utah 401, 28 P.2d 607. The
Court stated in part in the Colovos case at page 406:
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"It is the opm10n of this Court that the term
used, 'engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit,' has
a well defined meaning. It means ability to follow
any recognized occupation, and to do substantially all the acts that are necessarily and usually
performed by one who follows that occupation.
It could not be said that a man could engage
in an occupation if he were able to do only one
or two of the acts customarily performed by one
engaged in such an occupation. Furthermore,
there is an element of continuity in following
an occupation; . . . furthermore, 'compensation
or profit', as used in the paragraph quoted from
the policy, is qualified, and relates to the preceding words, 'engaging in any occupation and
performing any work,' and contemplates that
the compensation or profit to be received from
the occupation engaged in, or work done, shall,
in a fair sense, be remunerative, and not merely
nominal, and in the case at bar a small farmer
who could not do substantially all of the labor
that usually is necessary to be done, or a peddler
who cannot lift or handle the bags of produce
he is accustomed to peddle, could not conduct
his farming or his peddling for profit or compensation in a remunerative sense."

The Colovos case was followed by the Browning
case, supra, in holding that an oral surgeon who could
not perform substantially all of the acts necessary in
his profession was totally disabled within the terms of
the policy in question.
Thus it can be seen that the jury verdict holding
that Plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled 1~
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well supported by the evidence in this case to the effect
that Plaintiff cannot perform his usual and ordinary
occupation as a brick mason or brick contractor or any
other occupation for which he is fitted by experience and
education, his education being only a fifth grade education and his experience being solely in the field of hard
manual labor.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED DAMAGES FOR FUTURE
BENEFITS.
The evidence in this case showed that Plaintiff was
totally and permanently disabled within the meaning
of the policies in question. The evidence further showed
that Defendant repudiated its obligation under the
policies by unequivocally refusing to pay any benefits
based on a total permanent disability.
Plaintiff performed all of his duties under the policies by submitting his periodic reports. Defendants
repudiated their obligations under the policies as found
by the jury.
The better reasoned line of authorities in the United
States supports the holding of the Trial Court in the
case at bar that the insurance company cannot repudiate
the contract and then be able to pay off in periodic
installments as provided in said policies, but must
respond in damages for the anticipatory breach of the
contract.
The best way in which damages for the breach can
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be calculated is the method used in the case at bar, used
in many of the cases cited herein. This method is the
one customarily presented to juries in personal injury
and death cases by taking the life expectancy of the
Plaintiff and discounting to the present value the benefits for the total life expectancy in the one policy and
for the period of time involved in the other. Exhibit
P.15 contains the precise calculations both for the past
amounts due and for the future benefits reduced to
present value as supported by the testimony of Ralph
Cowan as to the rate of return an ordinary prudent
person could expect in this community with sound investments of his money.
The case of Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Rascoe
(6th Cir. 1926) 12 F.2d 693, cert. den. 273 U.S. 722,
47 S.Ct. 112, is the leading case for the rule urged by
Plaintiff. The Court held in the Rascoe case that where
a contract is executory, the rule that there can be no
anticipatory breach of a unilateral contract for the payment of money at some future date does not apply. The
Court held that where the right of an insured to collect
disability benefits payable in installments depended
upon her furnishing regularly to the insurer every
thirty days a physician's report stating fully her condition and the probable duration of her disability and
there was an unequivocal repudiation of the contract
by the insurer, she would have the right to recover
damages for breach of the entire contract. The Court
observed:
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"This is a single contract. The fact that defendant is required to perform in part at stated
intervals does not change its unitary character
into a multiplicity of contracts, each relating
to but one installment. If there has been an
actual breach, coupled with repudiation, of this
one contract, then, to avoid a multiplicity of
suits, public policy requires that plaintiff may
maintain but one action for the entire damages
occasioned by such breach."
Plaintiff in the Rascoe case was suing for benefits
on a disability policy and Defendant had paid a certain
amount of benefits including the hospital and medical
bills, and then refused to make more payments. The
Court held that this was a repudiation of the contract
on the part of the Defendant insurance company.
Another leading case for this rule is the case of
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Phifer (1923) 160 Ark.
98, 254 S.W. 335. In this case the insurance company
denied all liability under the permanent total disability
clause and also claimed that the policy had lapsed for
non-payment of premiums after the disability began.
The Court held that this was a renunciation of the contract and that plaintiff could sue for the future benefits
reduced to present value.
In the case of Milburn v. Royal Union Mutual Life
( 1921) 209 Mo.App. 228, 234 S.W. 378, the Court
applied the same rule stating in part at.page 381:
"Plaintiff cites Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo.
341, 166 S.W. 257, in support of his contention
that the law of this State is well settled that
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when defendant failed to perform its contract
and defaulted, all the installments thereby became due and payable.
';ye think this is good law and applies in this
case . . . this principal is so fundamental that
citations are unnecessary . . . . It is well settled
that the law frowns on a multiplicity of cases
where one action will suffice."
The case of Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Reed
(1913) 54 Ind. App. 450, 103 N.E. 77, stated:

"With few exceptions, the Courts of England
and America have held that the renunciation of
an executory contract, either before or after the
time of performance has arrived, or the refusal '
to carry out the provisions of a contract in course
of performance, gives the right of action to the
injured party for the damages sustained by reason of such breach or repudiation of the contract.
A denial of all liablity, where liability has attached, is held to give the injured party the right
to treat the contract as broken or repudiated
and to pursue his remedy for damages for the
breach, and to recover, once for all in a single
suit all that may be ultimately due him."
Also see the following cases which support this rule:

Travelers Protective Association of America v. Stephens
(Ark. 1932) 49 S.W.2d 365; Robbins v. Travelers Insurance Co. (1934) 151 l\lisc. 151, 269 N.Y.S. 841;
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Schneider (Ind.
1935) 193 N.E. 690; Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Sweet (1934) 253 Ky. 643, 69 S.,V.2d 748; Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Davis ( 1933) 187 Ark. 398, 60 S.,V.
30
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2d 912; Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Pool (Ark.
1934) 71 S.,V.2d 455; 11ravelers Insurance Co. v. Lancaster (Ga. 1935) 180 S.E. 641; Williams v. Mutual
Benefit Health and Accident Association (5th Cir.
1938) 100 F .2d 264.
Plaintiff urges the Court to adopt the more enlightened rule for the reason that justice is better served
by allowing a Plaintiff in such a case as this to recover
his entire damages in one law suit. The Defendants in
Exhibit P.3 repudiated all obligations for payment
of total permanent disability benefits. To attempt to
argue otherwise is in opposition to common sense. The
statement made by the insurance company was definite
and unequivocal. The company denied absolutely that
the accident caused a total and permanent disability
to the Plaintiff. How can it be argued that this is not
a repudiation of the obligation of the Company?
The other rule leads to a multiplicity of lawsuits
which is contrary to sound public policy. The Company
should not be allowed to repudiate its policy and then
pay out monthly according to the terms of the policy.
It should pay damages for its breach.
According to Defendants' brief, the Company
would still require monthly proofs of disability. What
would prevent the Company from again refusing to
accept the proofs of disability as it did previously? The
jury found that Plaintiff was totally and permanently
disabled. The rule urged by Defendants would require
Plaintiff to run the gauntlet each and every month.
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The Colovos case, supra, has been cited as authority
for the rule that future benefits cannot be collected in
this type of a lawsuit. However, the statement made
by the Court was dicta inasmuch as future benefits were
not sought.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's disability could
miraculously improve and therefore damages should
not be assessed for the future benefits. Defendants make
this argument in the face of all of the medical evidence
that the disability which Plaintiff has is permanent.
If his disability is permanent, then certainly it cannd
lessen in the future.

POINT III. DEFENDANTS l\IADE NC
ISSUE AS TO PLAINTIFF'S LIFE EXPEC. ,
TAN CY.
Defendants claim that the Court erred in taking
away from the jury the determination of life expectancy
of Plaintiff. Defendants make this claim in spite of the
fact they offered no evidence that Plaintiff's life expectancy would be shortened on account of his physical
condition.
The record will show that counsel made no objection when the Court decided to take the damage evidence out of the presence of the jury. Certainly, had
counsel wished to dispute any of the evidence offered
as to damages, he had the right to do so, but did not
avail himself of this right. Counsel did cross-examine
German Ellsworth Brunson, the certified public ac-
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1

countant who prepared the tables, and was told that
the life expectancy tables included statistics as to all
persons whether in good or bad health. Had counsel
desired to offer testimony that Greguhn' s life expectancy would be diminished, he had the right to do so.
Since the life expectancy table was not challenged and
was the only evidence produced as to Plaintiff's life
expectancy, then, of course, the Court had the right to
use the table as prepared by Mr. Brunson to assess the
total amount of damages.
The use of life expectancy with tables based thereon
has for many years been an acceptable method of proving damages in personal injury cases involving permanent disability and in wrongful death cases. What better
way could be used for determining the total value of
the insurance policies in question?
Defendants are in no position to complain for the
first time in this Court that the life expectancy of
Plaintiff should have been given to the jury when they
made no such request or offered no evidence at all disputing the life expectancy as shown in the tables.
Furthermore, Defendants neither requested instructions nor excepted to the Court's instructions concerning the issue of life expectancy and cannot, therefore, raise the question on appeal. See Pettingill v.
Perkins ( 1954) 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P .2d 185.
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CONCLUSION
The case was submitted to the jury on instructions
based on the law of the Lee and Colovos cases. The evi·
dence supported a finding that the accident of September 21, 1964 activated and precipitated a latent,
dormant condition to a disability condition. The evidence
was undisputed that Plaintiff is suffering from a permanent disability which is total under the definitions
in the policies. The Company repudiated its clear obli·
gation under the policies on proper proof submitted to
it. Justice demands that the judgment of the lower
court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK
Rawlings, Roberts & Black
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RICHARD B. WOOLLEY
314 Atlas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent,
Harry C. Greguhn

34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

